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Abstract
The idea that mind and body are distinct entities that interact is often claimed
to be incompatible with physics. The aim of this paper is to disprove this claim. To
this end, we construct a broad mathematical framework that describes theories with
mind-body interaction (MBI) as an extension of current physical theories. We employ
histories theory, i.e., a formulation of physical theories in which a physical system is
described in terms of (i) a set of propositions about possible evolutions of the system
and (ii) a probability assignment to such propositions. The notion of dynamics is
incorporated into the probability rule. As this formulation emphasises logical and
probabilistic concepts, it is ontologically neutral. It can be used to describe mental
‘degrees of freedom’ in addition to physical ones. This results into a mathematical
framework for psycho-physical interaction (ΨΦI formalism). Interestingly, a class of
ΨΦI theories turns out to be compatible with energy conservation.
1 Introduction
Any theory of mind that postulates mental states as fundamentally different from physical
states has to explain how mental states can influence physical states and vice versa. The
existence of such amind-body interaction (MBI) is a natural common-sense belief. However,
no theory has been developed to substantiate this belief, and several arguments have been
put forward that such interactions are incompatible with the physical sciences.
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In this paper, we contend the opposite: the conceptual tools for describing MBI are
already present in contemporary theoretical physics. MBI is not contained within existing
fundamental theories of physics, but those theories have a mathematical structure that can
be employed in order to formulate theories with MBI. We demonstrate this by the explicit
construction of a general mathematical framework for such theories.
Contemporary physics is based on a small number of fundamental theories—like quan-
tum theory and general relativity—that pertain to describe all phenomena in their domain.
These theories are mathematical: their concepts are represented by mathematical objects,
and their principles can be expressed as mathematical axioms. Physics theories place a
strong emphasis on the causal and structural features of the objects they study, and give
relatively little attention to their ontology.
The emphasis on mathematical structure is a crucial factor that could lead to theories
of MBI that make empirically testable predictions, even if their ontology is vague. As a
matter of fact, our current fundamental theory for the microcosm, quantum mechanics,
works exactly this way. To quote Dirac [1],
When you ask what are electrons and protons I ought to answer that this question is not
a profitable one to ask and does not really have a meaning. The important thing about
electrons and protons is not what they are but how they behave, how they move. I can
describe the situation by comparing it to the game of chess. In chess, we have various
chessmen, kings, knights, pawns and so on. If you ask what a chessman is, the answer
would be that it is a piece of wood, or a piece of ivory, or perhaps just a sign written on
paper, or anything whatever. It does not matter. Each chessman has a characteristic way
of moving and this is all that matters about it. The whole game of chess follows from this
way of moving the various chessmen.
We find the attitude expressed by Dirac to be very fruitful for the mind-body problem.
One should simply substitute the ”electrons and protons” in Dirac’s quote with thoughts,
qualia or any other mental object. We can even expand on Dirac’s metaphor. A theory
with MBI is analogous to a game that is played with two chess-boards, the mental board
and the physical board. We should look for a new set of rules that describe how the
movements of the pieces on one board are interconnected and affect the movements of the
pieces on the other.
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To this end, we must first reformulate the existing physical theories in a way that is
amenable to such a generalization. We will show that the logical reformulation of physical
theories in terms of histories—see, Sec. 3 for explanations of the terminology—satisfy
this condition. The result is general mathematical framework for theories that describe
MBI. We will refer to this framework as ΨΦI formalism, i.e., a formalism for theories with
psycho-physical interaction.
Such theories will involve psycho-physical laws that ‘relate experience to elements of
physical theory’ as proposed by Chalmers [2,3]. However, in contrast to Chalmers’ proposal,
the ΨΦΙ formalism does not describe the physical world as causally closed. The physical
and the mental fully act upon each other. It turns out that some ΨΦI theories are fully
compatible with energy conservation, hence removing a common objection to MBI.
The structure of this paper is the following. In Sec. 2, we explain how interactions of
fundamentally different substances are described in current theories of physics. In Sec. 3,
we present the main ideas of histories-based reformulations of physical theories. In Sec. 4,
we argue that the natural way to explain the physical correlates of consciousness is to view
such correlations as dynamical, i.e., as arising from the interaction of mental and physical
degrees of freedom. Then, we show how this interaction is described in the ΨΦΙ formalism.
In Sec. 5, we discuss the role of energy and information in the ΨΦΙ formalism and how
they relate to open problems in physics. In the last section, we summarise and discuss our
results.
2 General Relativity as a prototype for MBI
A traditional objection to theories of MBI is that if mental and physical properties are
ontologically different, then they lack the communality that is necessary for interaction.
This objection was raised against Cartesian dualism already in the 17th century. It was a
strong argument as long as physical interactions were deemed to be mechanistic and to be
based on physical contact of extended objects. Today, this argument has little force. First,
because Bell’s theorem asserts that it is impossible to describe the fundamental physical
interactions mechanistically. Second, because physics already contains theories about the
interaction between radically different ‘substances’. General Relativity (GR), our current
theory of gravity, describes the interaction between spacetime geometry and matter. In this
3
section, we elaborate on the latter point, and we argue that GR provides a methodological
template for formulating theories of MBI.
We first explain the meaning of the terms ”spacetime geometry” and ”matter”. Space-
time geometry is the structure that determines what clocks and rods measure, i.e., spatial
and temporal distances between physical events. Events are represented by points on a
four-dimensional manifold M . Three coordinates on M refer to space and one coordinate
refers to time. In GR, matter can be taken roughly to refer to entities that extend in space
and carry energy and momentum. Spacetime geometry and matter are essentially distinct,
and their differences are not blurred by the fact that they interact.
General Relativity describes the interaction between matter and geometry by embed-
ding both entities within a broad mathematical framework, namely, Lagrangian field theory
(LFT) [4]. The LFT was initially conceived as a generalization of classical mechanics for
continuous systems. The properties of continuous systems are expressed in terms of clas-
sical fields. A classical field is a map φ : M → S, for some set S, i.e., a maps that assigns
one mathematical object φ(X) ∈ S to each spacetime point X. LFT enables us to de-
scribe a system’s dynamics in terms of partial differential equations that are satisfied by
the classical fields.
Note that the formulation of GR in terms of LFT was not accidental. LFT originates
from the tradition of 19th century’s analytical dynamics. The latter was explicitly cham-
pioned as an abstract theory of dynamics that could be used without commitment to a
specific ontology of the microscopic structure of matter and/or the ether [5]. This is the
reason why it survived the demise of mechanistic models for matter and ether, and it
remains an indispensable physics tool.
Spacetime geometry is expressed in terms of a field g, the Lorentzian metric. The
metric g incorporates all geometric information in a compressed form. Spatial and temporal
distances are obtained by decompressing the information contained in the metric through
the solution of the so-called geodesic equations. The correspondence between geometries
and metrics is not one-to-one. A metric also carries some non-geometric information about
the choice of a coordinate system, with the result that one geometry corresponds to an
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infinity of different metrics1.
In contrast, there is a huge loss of information when we use classical fields to describe
matter. Fundamentally, matter is described by quantum theory; in the LFT description,
quantum effects are ignored (or averaged out). The treatment of matter as continuous at
macroscopic scales also implies that the discrete structure at the atomic level is ignored.
The description of matter and geometry in terms of classical fields is suboptimal for
both matter and gravity. The field description of geometry contains too much information,
the field description of matter contains too little. The LFT formulation of matter-gravity
interaction in GR is a working compromise, and not a perfect fit. Nonetheless, it suffices
for a formulation of a theory in which ‘spacetime tells matter how to move; matter tells
spacetime how to curve’ [6].
The compromises involved in the formulation of GR are anything but benign. They are
the source of major problems in any attempt to extend GR, for example, towards a quantum
theory of gravity2. Nonetheless, GR works. It has a consistent and elegant mathematical
structure, and it leads to predictions with excellent agreement to the experiment.
GR suggests the following strategy for describing the interaction between two ontolog-
ically different entities A and B.
1. Identify an appropriate mathematical framework Dyn for the description of dynamics
(the analogue of LFT for GR).
2. Represent entity A by mathematical objects FA and entityB by mathematical objects
FB, where both FA and FB fit within the structure of Dyn. These representations
need not be one-to-one; they may involve either redundancy or information loss.
3. Identify all possible dynamics in Dyn that involve interaction between FA and FB.
In the present context, we want A to correspond to mental states/processes and B
to physical states/processes. We have a very good idea of the mathematical structures
involved in B, and, thus, of possible frameworks Dyn compatible with B. In the next
1The space of all Lorentzian metrics on the spacetime manifold M is denoted by LRiem(M). The
space of spacetime geometries is the quotient manifold LRiem(M)/Diff(M) where Diff(M) is the infinite-
dimensional group of diffeomorphisms on M .
2Most of these problems are facets of the so-called problem of time in quantum gravity [7–9].
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section, we will present what we believe to be the most appropriate framework for theories
of MBI, namely, histories theory.
3 Histories theory
In this section, we present the logical reformulation of physical theories that is based on
histories, to which we will refer as histories theory. A history is a time-ordered sequence
of properties of a physical system. In histories theory, any physical system is described in
terms of (i) logical propositions about histories of the system and of (ii) the probabilities
associated to such propositions. In particular, the notion of dynamics is incorporated into
the rule of probability assignment3. The emphasis on the logical and probabilistic aspects
of physical theories makes histories theory particularly suitable for the description of MBI,
because propositions and probabilities are ontologically neutral. They can be meaningfully
defined also for mental processes.
The idea of translating physics into the language of logical propositions originates
from von Neumann and Birkhoff [10]. The idea that dynamics can be incorporated into
the probability assignment for histories (in both classical or quantum physics) is due to
Wigner and collaborators [11]. The logical reformulation of quantum mechanics in terms of
histories is a key achievement of the consistent/decoherent histories approach to quantum
theory by Griffiths, Omnés, Gell-Mann and Hartle [12–15]. This reformulation is the basis
of our presentation here, as it can easily be adapted to any physical theory by using the
temporal logic axiomatization developed by Isham [16,17]. The consistent incorporation of
dynamics in histories theory and the analysis of the theory’s temporal structure is due to
Savvidou [18,19]. For the relation of histories theory to stochastic processes, see, Ref. [20]
and for the histories theory version of GR, see, Ref. [21].
3Physical theories are traditionally described in terms of kinematics, dynamics and initial conditions.
Kinematics defines the physical variables and the symmetries of a system, and how the former relate to
measurable quantities. Dynamics describes how physical variables evolve in time. Initial conditions are
necessary in order to obtain unique predictions about particular physical systems. In histories theory,
the notion of kinematics is incorporated into the definition of the space of history propositions, while the
notions of dynamics and initial conditions are incorporated into the rule of probability assignment.
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3.1 History propositions
Consider an elementary physical system: a point-like particle moving in a line. This system
is described by propositions such as the following.
• κt = ”at time t, the particle’s position x takes values between 3m and 5m” (in a
given coordinate system);
• λt = ”at time t, the particle’s momentum p takes values between 5kgm/s and
6kgm/s”;
• µt = ”at time t, the particle’s energy E takes values between 5J and 100J”.
The propositions above refer to a single moment of time t. For a given particle, they
may be true or they may be false. It turns out that all single-time propositions about
one particle can be expressed solely in terms of the particle’s position and momentum.
Each proposition corresponds to a subset C of the state space Γ, i.e., a set that consists of
points (x, p). The elements of Γ are called microstates and they provide the most precise
description of the system at one moment of time.
We can also consider history propositions for the particle, i.e. propositions that refer
to more than one moments of time. The following are examples.
• α = ”at time t1, the particle’s position x takes values between 3m and 5m, and at
time t2 the particle’s momentum takes values between 5kgm/s and 6kgm/s”
• β = ”at all times t between t1 and t2, the particle’s momentum p takes values between
5kgm/s and 6kgm/s ”
• γ = ”at some time t between t1 and t2, the particle is recorded by a detector located
at x = 0”
We will denote the set of history propositions of a system by V .
History propositions correspond to subsets C of the history space Π. In order to define
the latter, we first identify a time-set T that consists of all time instants t, and it is
equipped with an ordering relation ≤, with the physical interpretation of ”earlier than”.
The history space is defined as the space of all paths on Γ, where a path ξ : T → Γ is
a function that assigns one point ξ(t) ∈ Γ to each time t ∈ T . The points of Π are called
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fine-grained histories. They define propositions that give the most precise description of
the physical system at all times (fine-grained propositions). History propositions that are
not fine-grained are called coarse-grained. For example, in a theory where the fine-grained
histories refer to atomic motions, any history about properties of neurons is coarse-grained.
We can combine history propositions using logical operators such as AND, OR, IMPLIES,
NOT, and so on. Given two history propositions α and β, we can always define the history
propositions αAND β, αOR β, α IMPLIES β, and NOTα. We also define the impossible
history proposition ∅ (the proposition that can never be true) and the trivial history
proposition 1 (the proposition that can never be false). We call two history propositions
α and β disjoint, if there is no way that they can both be both true, i.e., if αAND β =
∅. Coarse-grained propositions are obtained by joining disjoint fine-grained propositions
through the connective OR.
Obviously, single-time propositions are special cases of history propositions. Some
multi-time history propositions can be constructed from single-time propositions using the
connective AND THEN of temporal conjunction. For example, the propositions α, κt and
λt defined earlier satisfy
α = κt1 AND THENλt2 , t1 < t2. (1)
In systems described by classical physics, we can always find a set Π of fine-grained histories,
so that any history proposition α corresponds to a subset C(α) of Π. Hence, we can
express all logical operations set-theoretically. For example, C(αAND β) = C(α) ∩ C(β),
C(NOTα) = Π−C(α), and so on. Hence, the set of history propositions has the structure
of a Boolean algebra.
History propositions in quantum systems are very different. They do not have a Boolean
algebra structure. Furthermore, there is an infinity of different fine-grained sets of histories,
and each set defines a different physical description of a physical system. The mathematical
structure of the space of history propositions is significantly more complex. Its intricacies,
while crucial from the perspective of quantum foundations, are peripheral to the aims of
this paper. A brief description of quantum history propositions and of their mathematical
structure is given in the Appendix A. The reader may consult Ref. [16] for a detailed
analysis.
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3.2 Probability assignment
The predictions of all physical theories are expressed in terms of probabilities assigned
to history propositions. A partial probability function Prob(·) is a rule that assigns a
probability Prob(α) to history propositions α that belong in a subsetW of the set V ; W is
typically closed under the logical operations mentioned earlier. The restriction of history
propositions to a subset W is a typical quantum phenomenon. Quantum probabilities are
always defined in reference to a context, for example, a specific experimental configuration.
If W = V , then we call Prob(·) a complete probability function.
Given a probability function Prob(·), one defines the conditional probability of a history
proposition α given a history proposition β, as
Prob(α|β) = Prob(αAND β)Prob(β) . (2)
The physical predictions of the theory are typically expressed in terms of conditional prob-
abilities Prob(α|β), where α refers to measurement outcomes.
Three distinct types of probability functions are used in physics, whereupon one talks
about three types of processes: deterministic, stochastic and quantum. (Further types of
processes are mathematically possible, but have not yet found use in physics.)
Deterministic processes have the following property. For any single-time proposition αt, and
a time t′ > t, there is a unique minimal single-time proposition βt′ , such that Prob(βt′|αt) =
1. The proposition βt′ is minimal in the sense that, if some other proposition γt′ satisfies
Prob(γt′ |αt) = 1, then βt′ IMPLIES γt′ .
This definition of deterministic processes is restricted, as it ignores process with mem-
ory, but it suffices for present purposes. It characterizes all processes described by dynam-
ical systems, i.e., by differential equations on the state space Γ, like Newton’s equations
of classical mechanics. The key point is that in deterministic processes, probabilities refer
solely to the ignorance of the system’s precise initial conditions.
Stochastic processes are characterised by a complete probability function on V that satisfies
the Kolmogorov additivity condition: for all disjoint history propositions α and β,
Prob(αOR β) = Prob(α) + Prob(β). (3)
Examples of stochastic processes are Brownian motion, random walks and evolutionary
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processes. Strictly speaking, deterministic processes are a special case of stochastic pro-
cesses.
Quantum processes are different. The natural probability function for quantum history
propositions does not satisfy Kolmogorov’s additivity condition for arbitrary history propo-
sitions α and β. This implies that in any given physical situation, probabilities cannot be
assigned to all possible history propositions, but only to a specific subset thereof. Hence,
quantum probability measures are partial. The exact specification of propositions to which
probabilities can be assigned is a open issue in quantum foundations that is closely related
to the quantum measurement problem. However, an uncontroversial choice is to restrict
to history propositions that describe measurement outcomes in specific experiments. In
this case, the probabilities associated to quantum processes coincides with the standard
formulations of quantum theory in the Copenhagen interpretation [11, 20].
The three types of processes above are related. Deterministic processes can arise as
limiting behavior of either stochastic or quantum processes, and stochastic processes can
arise as limiting behavior of either deterministic or quantum processes. In what follows,
we shall refer to deterministic and stochastic processes as classical processes, in the sense
that they are compatible with classical physics (as contrasting quantum physics).
4 Histories theory description of MBI
4.1 Propositions about mental processes
In this section, we consider history propositions associated to a psycho-physical system
and we argue that the most natural mathematical description of such systems introduces
irreducibly mental degrees of freedom in addition to physical ones.
Consider a system that consists of Mary, a human person that lives in a closed room,
together with all other physical objects in the room. We denote by VΦ the set of all
history propositions about physical properties of the system. For example, VΦ contains
propositions about a grey couch in the room, about Mary’s movements as she sits on the
couch, or about Mary’s neurons firing while she sleeps on the couch. In principle, VΦ is
fully determined from existing theories of physics.
There is also a set C of history propositions about mental properties in the system. Of
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course, these properties refer to Mary and not to any other object in the room. C includes
propositions about Mary’s emotions, thoughts and qualia. Physicalist theories of mind
would identify C with a subset of VΦ. We will argue that it is more reasonable to assume
that C is a subset of a different set VΨ of mental propositions that does not overlap with
VΦ. With this assumption, the set of all possible propositions about the system is the
Cartesian product VΦ × VΨ.
To this end, let us assume that Mary’s room initially contains no green or red object.
At time t0 an object is inserted in the room. This object may be either a green pepper
or a red rose. The pepper is green in the sense that it reflects light with wavelength of
500-550 nm; the rose is red in the sense that it reflects light with wavelength of 650-700
nm. Consider the history propositions
αg = ”A green pepper is inserted in the room at time t0, and then Mary sees it”,
αr = ”A red rose is inserted in the room at time t0, and then Mary sees it”.
By ”Mary sees it” we mean a conjunction of propositions that include light from the
object reaching Mary’s retina, and an electrochemical signal carrying this particular infor-
mation into the brain.
Next, we consider two history propositions that refer to mental properties,
βG = ”Mary has a GREEN experience at some time t after t0”,
βR = ”Mary has a RED experience at some time t after t0”.
GREEN and RED in capital letters refer to color qualia, i.e., individual instances of
color experience [22]. We can avoid using the word ”Mary” (which might require explaining
what a person is) by rephrasing βG as ”There is a GREEN experience at some time t after
t0” and similarly for βR.
Obviously, there is a strong correlation between αg and βG and between αr and βR.
Consider an experiment in which either the rose or the pepper is inserted into the room
and Mary telling us the color she sees. Repeating this experiment many times, we expect
to find the probabilities,
Prob(αr AND βR) = 1, Prob(αr AND βG) = 0,
Prob(αg AND βR) = 0, Prob(αg AND βG) = 1, (4)
modulo some errors of order ϵ << 1.
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The aim of many physicalist research programs is to map βR and βG to elements of
VΦ and to compute the probabilities (4) solely in terms of physics. The problem with this
program is that existing physical theories are expressed in terms of particle properties, field
properties, spacetime properties; qualia do not fit in.
Suppose then one finds a map that expresses βR in terms of physical properties, i.e.,
that βR logically coincides some proposition γR ∈ VΦ. In what sense does the proposition
γR depend on the quale RED? Since qualia appear neither in the construction of the space
of propositions, nor in the probability assignment, RED can only be used as a label, i.e.,
as a non-dynamical index that identifies this proposition. It is certainly not a property to
which the proposition refer. However, labels are arbitrary in physics: they are chosen as a
matter of convention and they can be interchanged at will. This implies that there is no
explanation from physics why one particular physical proposition α ∈ VΦ is correlated to
αR and not to αG, i.e., why a red rose corresponds to the experience RED and not to the
experience GREEN4.
Let us consider the situation formally, and ignore for the moment the meaning of the
propositions. We have two sets of propositions A = {αr, αg} and B = {βR, βG},
(i) with strong probabilistic correlations given by Eq. (4);
(ii) with no known way of logically identifying elements of A with elements of B;
(iii) with strong arguments that such an identification may not be possible—see, [22] and
references therein.
A physicist encountering this state of affairs in some problem would not hesitate to con-
clude that the correlations are dynamical. He or she would propose a model in which A
4This follows from an translation of Locke’s famous argument about an ‘inverted spectrum’ [23]—see
also Ref. [24] and references therein—into the language of contemporary physics. Let i : Cq → VΦ be
the inclusion map of the set Cq of propositions about qualia into the set VΦ of history propositions about
physical properties. Since qualia are not part of the physical theory, the physical predictions ought to
be the same for any inclusion map i′ = f ◦ i : Cq → VΦ, where f is an automorphism of Cq. Thus, the
probability assignment is invariant under the group Aut(Cq) of automorphisms of Cq. This means that
there is no dynamical reason why the insertion of a red rose is correlated with a RED quale rather than a
GREEN quale. As a matter of fact, there is no reason why the insertion of the rose is not correlated with
a sound quale, i.e., why Mary does not hear Beethoven’s 9th symphony on seeing the red rose.
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describes one particular set of degrees of freedom and B describes a set of different degrees
of freedom. These degrees of freedom interact dynamically in order to produce the proba-
bilistic correlations of Eq. (4). The properties of the different degrees of freedom and the
details of the interaction depend on the system under consideration, but the logic of the
explanation is system-independent.
Suppose we transfer this way of thinking to the mind-body problem. We should intro-
duce a set VΨ of history propositions about mental degrees of freedom, such that B ⊂ VΨ.
VΨ must be disjoint from VΦ, i.e., VΨ and VΦ contain different propositions. Since A ⊂ VΦ,
the dynamical correlations of Eq. (4) are to be explained in terms of a probability rule for
elements of the set VΦ × VΨ.
The history propositions in VΨ and VΦ may be different, but the two sets must have
isomorphic time-sets TΨ and TΦ. This means that there is a bijection f : TΦ → TΨ, such
that f(t1) ≤ f(t2) for all t1 ≤ t2. This is physically obvious: if Mary experiences GREEN
before RED, then the time of the GREEN experience (as measured by a physical clock)
must be prior to the time of the RED experience. In other words, psychological time and
physical time have the same ordering.
4.2 The ΨΦΙ formalism
The arguments above suggest the following framework for theories with psycho-physical
interaction (ΨΦΙ formalism).
1. Causal structure. The studied systems involve both physical and mental processes. All
possible scenarios about a specific system can be expressed in terms of history propositions
defined with respect to a time-set T .
2. Set of propositions. History propositions have one physical and one mental component,
i.e., they belong to the set VΦ×VΨ, where VΦ contains history propositions about physical
degrees of freedom and VΨ contains history propositions about mental degrees of freedom.
Purely physical propositions are of the form (α,1Ψ) and purely mental propositions are
of the form (1Φ, α). We will denote such propositions as αΦ and αΨ, respectively. Hence,
we can express a general history proposition α = αΦ AND αΨ, i.e., as a logical conjunction
of its physical component αΦ and its mental component αΦ.
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3. Probability rule. There is a class of partial probability functions Prob(·) on VΦ × VΨ
that determine physical predictions. The assumption of partial probability functions allows
us to accommodate a quantum theory, without committing to a particular interpretation.
The complexity of the quantum probability rule for histories implies that there are many
more possible ways of expressing mental-physical interaction than in classical physics.
If we treat matter as classical, then we can take Prob(·) to be a complete probability
function.
The probability function incorporates non-trivial dynamical interaction between mental
and physical degrees of freedom. This means that conditional probabilities of the form
Prob(αΦ|βΨ) and Prob(γΨ|δΦ) have non-trivial dependency on propositions βΨ and δΦ,
respectively.
4. Limiting behavior. Let us denote by ΩΦ the proposition that there are no physical
processes at any t ∈ T . ΩΦ is not to be confused with the impossible proposition ∅Φ. We
also denote by ΩΨ the proposition that there are no mental processes at any t ∈ T . We
expect that in absence of mental processes, the probability function reduces to the known
one of physics, denoted by ProbΦ, i.e.,
Prob(αΦ AND ΩΨ) = ProbΦ(αΦ). (5)
Unless we want to entertain the possibility of ghosts, we must postulate that no mental
processes are possible in absence of physical processes, i.e.,
Prob(ΩΦ AND αΨ) = 0. (6)
The principles above can be naturally incorporated into the temporal logic description
of histories [16], and, thereby, provide an axiomatic characterization of the ΨΦΙ formalism.
Technical details in the formulation and elaboration of the axioms will be presented in a
different publication. The key point is that the principles above define a general frame-
work that can accommodate many different theories of MBI. Such theories will differ on
the mathematical characterization of VΨ (the fundamental mental variables), and on the
explicit construction of the probability function Prob(·) (dynamics).
At the moment, we know the structure of VΦ and its associated probability rule. VΦ
consists of all history propositions allowed by the Standard Model of particle physics, and
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Prob(·) is the standard probability assignment for history propositions in quantum theory.
Physics at the nuclear scale and beyond is most likely irrelevant to a mind-body coupling,
so we can coarse-grain away Standard Model physics, and take VΦ to contain propositions
about nuclei, electrons and the EM field; the probability assignment will again be quantum.
It is a widely held belief among neuroscientists that we can coarse-grain even further, and
that it suffices to work with a set VΦ of propositions about macromolecules or cells, subject
to a classical probability assignment. In any case, the Φ part of a ΨΦΙ theory is based on
known physics.
In contrast, the Ψ part is largely unknown. We know many history propositions about
mental processes at a phenomenological level, and these are elements of VΨ. However,
we know nothing about the mathematical structure of VΨ, i.e., its fine-grained histories
and how they can be joined through the OR operation in order to form coarse-grained
propositions. Hence, the known elements of VΨ are disconnected from any underlying
structure. The latter can be provided only by a mature mathematical theory of mind. It
is quite possible that our familiar mental processes correspond to a highly coarse-grained
mental history propositions, the same way that our everyday experience lies at a level of
description much coarser than that of fundamental physics.
The probability assignment on VΦ×VΨ is also unknown, except for the condition that it
reduces to the probability rules of physics in absence of mental phenomena. Since matter is
fundamentally quantum mechanical, a fundamental ΨΦΙ theory cannot be classical. Then,
there are only three conceivable scenarios. Fundamental ΨΦΙ processes are either (i) fully
quantum, which means that mental processes should also be subject to the probabilistic
rules of quantum mechanics, or (ii) they involve a quantum/classical hybrid (see, Sec. 5.3),
or (iii) they follow a probability rule with no analogue in current physics.
The conclusion above does not preclude the use of classical ΨΦI theories at coarser
levels of description, since classical processes often emerge as limiting cases of quantum
ones. Indeed, most neuroscience research proceeds under the assumption that the physical
phenomena correlated to mental processes are essentially classical. This means that the
relevant physical objects have lost their irreducible quantum features (except for the ones
pertaining to the chemical properties of atoms). There are theoretical objections to this
point of view, which originate from proposals that quantum phenomena are important for
understanding consciousness, for example, Refs. [25–27]. We are agnostic on this issue. The
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General Relativity ΨΦΙ formalism
Mathematical Framework (Dyn) Lagrangian Field Theory Histories Theory
Component A spacetime geometry mind
Representation of A Lorentzian metric fine-grained elements of VΨ
Component B matter matter
Representation of B matter fields fine-grained elements of VΦ
Interaction Lagrangian dynamics probabilities on VΦ × VΨ
Table 1: Structural correspondence between the ΨΦΙ formalism and GR.
ΨΦI formalism works either way, but it is much easier to work with if quantum phenomena
can be ignored.
In principle, classical probabilistic models for a few discrete degrees of freedom can be
constructed directly from the ΨΦΙ axioms, without any knowledge of the deep structure
of VΨ. Such models could describe elementary mental processes, like, for example, the
distinction of a small number of colors by a living person. It is too early to tell whether
they could lead to testable predictions or not.
Finally, we remind the reader that the overall rationale of the ΨΦΙ formalism conforms
to the strategy that was sketched in Sec. 2—see, Table (1) for the analogy to GR.
5 ΨΦΙ theories and physics
In the previous section, we argued that the histories description of physical theories can
easily be extended to incorporate mental degrees of freedom. Here, we explore plausible
properties of such theories, especially, in relation to open issues in physics.
5.1 Energy conservation
A popular objection to theories of MBI is that MBI conflicts with fundamental laws of
physics, in particular the conservation of energy. A problem with this objection is that it
assumes a 19th century understanding of physics. Today, we know that energy conservation
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is not a universal law, as it does not hold in General Relativity5 and it holds only with
qualifications in quantum theory6. Thus, an MBI theory with no strict energy conservation
is not problematic in an epistemic sense—for further discussion, see [28, 29].
More importantly, MBI does not always lead to a violation of energy conservation. In
the Appendix, we study the status of energy conservation for classical ΨΦΙ processes. We
identify dynamics that are fully compatible with energy conservation, in the sense that
the MBI does not add or subtract energy to the physical degrees of freedom. Energy
conservation is a consequence of a particular coupling between the mental and the physical
degrees of freedom. This coupling is neither artificial nor contrived: it is mathematically
elegant and simple, as befits a fundamental theory. It can also be generalized for quantum
systems.
Energy-conserving ΨΦΙ theories are aesthetically appealing, but certainly, other options
are available. For example, one may consider MBI dynamics that conserve a generalised
notion of energy. In mechanical systems, energy conservation is a consequence of the
symmetry of time translation, i.e., the requirement that the dynamics is unchanged under
a transformation that moves the time of the various events by a constant amount. If a
ΨΦI theory shares this symmetry, then a generalised energy variable—that depends on both
physical and mental degrees of freedom—is plausibly conserved. Hence, we can continue to
use our current notion of energy, provided we include a contribution from mental processes.
After all, the notion of energy has been generalised many times ever since its inception, as
it has been applied to increasingly broader categories of phenomena.
It is also possible that a ΨΦI theory does not admit either energy conservation or
5Energy is conserved only in stationary spacetimes, i.e., a class of spacetimes characterized by a specific
symmetry (the existence of a timelike Killing field). Energy is not conserved in generic spacetimes. For
example, energy is not conserved in the expanding universe models that are employed in cosmology. Energy
conservation holds approximately at scales much smaller than the Hubble length that characterises the
expansion of the universe.
6In quantum theory, energy is strictly conserved only for a particular class of initial states (namely,
the eigenstates of the Hamiltonian operator). In general, what is conserved (i.e., it is the same at all
times) is the probability distribution for the values of energy. This means that two individual quantum
systems that have been prepared identically will, in general, be measured with different values of energy.
Of course, a measured system is an open system, so one does not expect energy to be preserved during
the measurement process. In any case, the statement that the value of energy remains the same during
time evolution is not true.
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conservation of some generalised notion of energy. In this case, energy conservation is an
approximate conservation law that holds in regimes where the MBI is negligible. Approx-
imate conservation laws are quite common in physics, they apply to physical quantities
that are conserved in a large classes of interactions but not in all. One example is isospin
which is conserved in strong and electromagnetic interactions but not in weak interactions.
5.2 Threshold states
We believe that a living person has mental activity, but we ordinarily deny such activity
to the dead body of the same person, as we deny it to rocks, cars, electrons or computers.
Thus, we believe that in some systems mental processes never occur, and that in some
other systems mental processes sometimes occur and sometimes do not. In a ΨΦΙ theory,
we implement such distinctions by introducing a set of propositions Ωt ∈ VΨ which assert
that no mental processes take place at time t. For rocks, cars and so on, the probabil-
ities associated to propositions of VΨ other than Ωt are always zero. For living people,
probabilities for propositions other than Ωt can obviously be non-zero.
The analogue of Ωt in physics is the vacuum of quantum field theory (QFT). The
vacuum is the state of the system in which no particles (of a given type A) are present. In
QFT, one is often interested in the generation of A particles from the vacuum, for example,
in the presence of other particles or external fields. These phenomena reveal the interaction
channels of the A-particles with the rest of the world.
We can follow an analogous reasoning in the ΨΦI formalism. Let C denote a configu-
ration of a physical system, i.e., a subset of the system’s state space Γ. We represent the
proposition that C is present at time t by Ct. The family of history propositions
η(C) = (Ωt ANDCt)AND THEN (NOTΩt′) (7)
for t′ > t describes the generation of mental states out of the mental ‘vacuum’ Ω. If C
describes a rock, a car, or a dead body, any reasonable probability assignment will give
Prob[η(C)] = 0. The same holds if C describes a living person. However, there exist
physical configurations C for which Prob[η(C)] > 0. Such configurations are responsible
for the generation of (proto)mental states from non-mental states: they are the threshold
to the world of mental processes—see, Fig. 1.
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Figure 1: A graphical description of threshold states. We assume that mental degrees of freedom
are initially in their ‘vacuum’ Ω. Processes of type 1 cannot generate mental states out of Ω. Only
if the physical state is a threshold state (processes of type 2) is it possible to reach a non-trivial
mental state.
A formal definition of threshold states should also involve some condition of minimality,
otherwise the whole Earth 4.5 billion years ago would qualify as a threshold state. Hence,
we require that a threshold state satisfies Prob[η(C)] > 0 and also Prob[η(D)] = 0, for any
D ⊂ C.
Threshold states are crucial for understanding how organisms with mental processes
emerged in the history of life. Furthermore, if the analogy to QFT is valid, the proper-
ties of threshold configurations may suggest the form of the MBI-generating terms in the
probability assignment.
In QFT, the defining feature of threshold configurations is energy: no A particle can be
generated from the vacuum unless the available energy is greater than the rest mass mA of
A. When asking what is the analogue of energy for the threshold configurations of a ΨΦI
theory, there seems to be an obvious answer: information. Many mental processes can be
described in terms of information processing, and, of course, the brain is an information-
processing system. Like causal ordering, the notion of information strands both sides
of the mental-physical divide. Indeed, it has been proposed as a crucial component of
psychophysical theories [3]. It is therefore plausible that threshold states are characterized
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by high informational capacity.
The problem here is that information theory concepts are not fundamental to our
current physical theories. They only provide an additional layer of interpretation and
some technical tools. Notions such as informational capacity or information processing
are not absolute properties of physical systems. One deterministic process is as good as
another in terms of information processing: there is no criterion for distinguishing the
electric currents inside a laptop from the motions of air molecules in an empty bottle. We
call the former information processing because of their meaningful output: the electric
currents cause a complex production of light on the liquid crystal display that we interpret
as text. This criterion presupposes us, i.e., the existence of mindful observers.
It is a plausible conjecture that the notions of information processing and informational
capacity are fundamentally defined in terms of mental processes, and not physical ones.
This would imply that threshold states ‘distribute’ the mental concept of information to
the physical degrees of freedom. Hence, MBI could lead to a fundamental definition of
information in physics.
5.3 MBI and quantum state reduction
The measurement problem in quantum theory is that quantum theory does not explain
the emergence of definite properties for physical systems (for example, measurement out-
comes). Definite properties are not, in general, compatible with quantum processes. One
possible resolution, suggested by the founders of quantum theory, is the use of irreducibly
classical concepts for the description of the measurement device. But what constitutes a
measuring device? If the a particle’s position is correlated to the reading of a pointer in an
apparatus, should we describe the pointer classically? What if the pointer is recorded by
a camera? Should we treat the pointer as a quantum system and the camera as classical?
The boundary of the quantum/classical divide appears arbitrary.
The problem is aggravated in interpretations of quantum theory that treat the quantum
state as an objective feature of a physical system. In these interpretations, the change
of state after measurement (quantum state reduction) is a physical process. Then, the
arbitrariness of the quantum/classical split implies an ambiguity in the physical description.
Von Neumann and Wigner proposed that the quantum/classical split and the body/mind
split coincide: the quantum state is reduced when the result of a measurement enters the
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observer’s consciousness [30, 31].
In contrast, dynamical state reduction models [32] postulate that there is a tiny prob-
ability of reduction for each particle’s wavefunction, which adds up to be significant for
systems that contain a huge number of particles. This explains why macroscopic measur-
ing apparatuses behave classically. Alternatively, one may postulate irreducibly classical
entities that universally interact with quantum systems. Barring consciousness, the main
candidate for this role is the gravitational field [33–37]. The only way to consistently
formulate a quantum-classical interaction involves dynamical state reduction for the quan-
tum system; again, this process can cause measurements apparatuses to always behave
classically.
The latter scenario is relevant to ΨΦΙ theories. If mental processes are treated classi-
cally, the resulting ΨΦΙ theory involves coupling of quantum to classical variables. Hence,
quantum systems undergo dynamical state reduction as a result of MBI. In other words,
dynamical reduction is a natural candidate for the physical channel through which mind
acts upon matter.
We do not propose ΨΦΙ theories as a solution to the quantum measurement problem.
We think that consciousness-based solutions to the measurement problem are highly coun-
terintuitive in the context of quantum cosmology. They seem to imply that no definite
properties could exist prior to the emergence of the first conscious observers. Nonetheless,
the ΨΦΙ formalism can, in principle, be used in order to construct predictive models of the
von Neumann-Wigner idea.
Reduction in ΨΦΙ theories is not the universally occurring process postulated by dy-
namical reduction models. Most probably, it would only occur in the nervous system of
biological organisms. Interestingly, ΨΦI predictions may turn out to be compatible with
proposals that relate dynamical reduction in the brain to consciousness—like, for example,
the theory of Orchestrated Objective Reduction by Hameroff and Penrose [26]—even if the
latter treats the physical world as causally closed.
5.4 Maxwell’s demon
The Maxwell-demon paradox is a thought experiment proposed by J. C. Maxwell in 1867,
according to which a demon can violate the second law of thermodynamics [38]. The
demon is a being that controls a small door between two chambers of gas. As individual
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gas molecules approach the door, the demon quickly opens and shuts the door so that fast
molecules pass into the other chamber, while slow molecules remain in the first chamber.
The demon’s action causes one chamber to warm up and the other to cool, thus decreasing
entropy and violating the Second Law of Thermodynamics.
An immense number of papers have been written about Maxwell’s demon, mainly
aiming to remove the challenge to the Second Law. The key idea is that the process of in-
formation acquisition has an entropy cost, so that the total entropy is not reduced when the
demon operates. While this research has led to many insights about the relation between
information and statistical mechanics, the demon has not been permanently exorcised:
In so far as the Demon is a thermodynamic system already governed by the Second Law,
no further supposition about information and entropy is needed to save the Second Law.
In so far as the Demon fails to be such a system, no supposition about the entropy cost of
information acquisition and processing can save the Second Law from the Demon [39].
In accordance with Maxwell’s original conception, theories with MBI severely threaten
the Second Law. To exorcise the Demon, we must restrict to ΨΦΙ models that are compat-
ible with the laws of thermodynamics, or possibly with a reasonable generalization thereof.
This generalization may involve, for example, a redefinition of entropy that incorporates
acquisition of information by mindful agents.
6 Conclusions
The main aim of this paper is to show that the popular assertion that MBI is incompatible
with physics is wrong. This was achieved by the construction of a mathematical framework
that enables the construction of theories with MBI as an extension of current physical
theories. The ΨΦI formalism originates from the histories formulation of physical theories,
and it describes irreducibly mental degrees of freedom that interact with the physical
degrees of freedom.
The ΨΦI formalism can incorporate any mental concept that can be expressed in terms
of abstract structural and causal relations. Certainly, there are aspects of the mind that go
beyond such relations; they cannot be described by the formalism. This is not a problem.
GR demonstrates that even a fundamental theory does not require a faithful representation
of the entities it describes, in order to be highly successful.
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Many mental processes involve conscious experience. We can represent mathematically
a conscious experience, by introducing a variable, say Con, that takes value 1 on all
states that involve conscious experience and 0 otherwise. The time evolution and causal
properties of the variable Con can then be studied for any psycho-physical configuration.
Obviously, the ΨΦΙ formalism cannot explain what ”conscious experience” is. The existence
of conscious experience has to be taken as a brute fact about the mind that defines the
fundamental building blocks of a theory.
Physicalist theories of mind often invoke the remarkable success of physics to explain
a huge number of phenomena through reduction to elementary physical processes. In our
opinion, such arguments only pay lip-service to physics, while ignoring its history and
actual research practice. The point is that neither reduction nor supervenience have been
particularly successful as research strategies in physics.
The key step in constructing fundamental physical theories has always been the identi-
fication of the appropriate degrees of freedom for the problem at hand. In all major discov-
eries, it was necessary to introduce new degrees of freedom, well beyond the ones that were
known at the time [40]. Examples include the electromagnetic field, the Rutherford-Bohr
model of the atom, the concept of particle spin, the spacetime metric in GR, and the large
number of new particles, charges and fields that had to be postulated in order to construct
the Standard Model of strong and electroweak interactions.
Ever since Newton, the most successful strategy in physics has been the search for
theories that unify seemingly very different phenomena by incorporating them in an over-
arching mathematical structure. Hence, the ΨΦΙ formalism is much closer to the research
practices of physics than any physicalist research program.
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A The structure of histories theory
In this Appendix, we briefly summarize some features of histories theory, both classical
and quantum.
A.1 Classical Histories Theory
Consider a system described by a sample space Γ that is a differentiable manifold. Single-
time propositions corresponds to measurable subsets C of Γ. Let T = {t1, t2, . . . , tn} be
a discrete time-set for this system with t1 < t2 < . . . < tn. In general, T may be any
partially ordered set, but here we restrict our considerations to the simplest case.
The path space Π consists of all maps γ : T → Γ. The set of history propositions V
consists of all measurable subsets of Π. Hence, we can write a history proposition for this
system as
α = (Ct1 , Ct2 , . . . , Ctn), (8)
where Cti is a subset of Γ that corresponds to the proposition that the system was found in
Cti at time ti. Logical operations are standardly defined in terms of set-theoretic operations
between subsets of Π.
A probability functional assigns a probability Prob(α) to each history proposition α ∈
V , as
Prob(α) =
∫
dx1 . . . dxnχCt1 (x1)χCt2 (x2) . . . χCtn (xn)p(x1, t1;x2, t2; . . . , xn, tn), (9)
where p(x1, t1;x2, t2; . . . , xn, tn) is a probability measure on Π, and χC the characteristic
function of the set C ⊂ Γ.
The theory of stochastic processes is an example of a classical history theory. Of
particular interest are Markovian processes, which describe probabilistic systems without
memory. The associate probability measures are of the form
p(x1, t1;x2, t2; . . . , xn, tn) = ρt1(x1)g(x2, t2|x1, t1)g(x3, t3|x2, t2) . . . g(xn, tn|xn−1, tn−1), (10)
where ρt1 is a probability density on Γ at the initial moment of time, and g(x2, t2|x1, t1) > 0
is the transition matrix between times t1 and t2. The transition matrix is stochastic, i.e.,
it satisfies ∫ dx2g(x2, t2|x1, t1) = 1.
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Deterministic processes (without memory) correspond to the degenerate case where the
transition matrix is a delta function, i.e.,
g(x2, t2|x1, t1) = δ[x2 − ft2,t1(x1)], (11)
where ft,t′ is a diffeomorphism on Γ indexed by t and t′. For classical mechanics and field
theory, see, Ref. [19].
A.2 Quantum histories theory
In Copenhagen quantum mechanics, propositions correspond to measurement outcomes.
Ideal measurements are described in terms of projection-valued measures (PVMs) on a
Hilbert space H, i.e., a family of projectors Pˆa indexed by a, that satisfy the following
properties: (i) mutual exclusion, PˆaPˆb = δabPˆa, and (ii) exhaustion
∑
a Pˆa = Iˆ.
A sequence of measurements at times t1, t2, . . . , tn corresponds to a sequence of PVMs
Pˆai,ti indexed by the time-parameter. A history of measurement outcomes is a sequence of
projectors
α := (Pˆa1,t1 , Pˆa2,t2 , . . . , Pˆan,tn). (12)
Suppose that the system is prepared at the state ρˆ0 at t = 0, and that its Hamiltonian is
Hˆ. The probability associated to α is
Prob(α) = Tr
(
Cˆαρˆ0Cˆ
†
α
)
, (13)
where
Cˆα = Pˆan,tn(tn) . . . Pˆa2,t2Pˆa1,t1(t1) (14)
is an operator associated to the history α, defined in terms of the Heisenberg-picture
projectors Pˆai,ti(ti) = eiHˆtiPˆai,tie−iHˆti .
The consistent/decoherent histories interpretation of quantum mechanics starts with
the observation that the sequence (Pˆa1,t1 , Pˆa2,t2 , . . . , Pˆan,tn) can be interpreted as referring to
propositions about properties of a physical system, and not only to measurement outcomes.
Then, it is possible to define logical operations, such as AND, OR, NOT and so on, between
those history propositions, and to define a set V if history propositions that is closed under
those operations.
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The set of history propositions is constructed in terms of the history Hilbert space Khis,
defined as the tensor product of single time Hilbert spaces,
Khis = ⊗t∈THt, (15)
where t is an element of the time-set T , and H is a copy of the single-time Hilbert space
indexed by t. The history (12) is represented by a projection operator Eˆ = Pˆa1,t1⊗ Pˆa2,t2⊗
. . . ⊗ Pˆan,tn on Khis. General history propositions are represented by projectors on Khis
that are not factorized. Then, the set V of history propositions coincides with the lattice
Λ(Khis) of projection operators on Khis. Hence, the logical operations on V coincide with
the lattice operations of Λ(Khis) [41].
The incorporation of dynamics into the histories description is rather intricate, and
it requires a detailed analysis of the symmetries of the formalism. For continuous time,
dynamics are implemented through an action operator that is defined on Khis [18].
The rule (13) does not define a probability measure on the set of history propositions.
Probabilities can only be defined with respect to a given context. In the Copenhagen
interpretation, the context is given by the measurement set-up, i.e., the choice of the
different PVMs at different moments of time.
In decoherent histories, the context is expressed in terms of the abstract concept of a
consistent set. To this end, we define the decoherence functional for a pair of histories α
and β of the form (13), as
d(α, β) = Tr
(
Cˆαρˆ0Cˆ
†
β
)
. (16)
The decoherence functional is extended to general history propositions by the requirements
of
• linearity: d(α OR γ, β) = d(α, β) + d(γ, β), for α AND γ = ∅, and
• hermiticity: d(α, β) = d(β, α)∗.
Then, d defines a bilinear map on V × V .
Consider a set W of history propositions that are mutually exclusive and exhaustive.
We call W a consistent set, if it satisfies the consistency condition
Re d(α, β) = 0, α ̸= β, (17)
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for all α, β ∈ W . Then, the diagonal elements of the decoherence functional define a
probability measure on S,
ProbW(α) = d(α, α), for all α ∈ W . (18)
Hence, in quantum theory we do not have a complete probability function on V , but a
family of partial probability functions ProbW , each corresponding to a different consistent
set W .
B Energy conservation in ΨΦI theories
In this section, we explore the issue of energy conservation in ΨΦI theories. We consider
classical processes, because energy conservation is precisely formulated in classical me-
chanics. However, some of the results can be appropriately generalised also for quantum
systems.
B.1 Energy conserving dynamics
We first consider deterministic processes. They describe dynamical systems, i.e., systems
with time evolution determined by a set of differential equations. These equations can be
interpreted as a flow on a differentiable manifold that plays the role of the state space.
For MBI models, the state space is of the form ΓΦ × ΓΨ, where ΓΦ contains the physical
degrees of freedom and ΓΨ contains the mental degrees of freedom.
We describe the physical degrees of freedom in terms of classical mechanics, so that
energy conservation is well-defined. Let us denote the points of ΓΦ by ξa, for some discrete
index a. Time evolution is given by Hamilton’s equation
ξ˙a = Pab∂bH, (19)
where H is the Hamiltonian, i.e., a function on ΓΦ whose values correspond to the usual
notion of energy.
The Poisson tensor Pab in Eq. (19) is antisymmetric, non-degenerate and satisfies
Jacobi’s identity
Pad∂dPbc + Pcd∂dPab + Pbd∂dPca = 0. (20)
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The antisymmetry of P guarantees the conservation of energy, since
H˙ = ∂aHξ˙
a = Pab∂aH∂bH = 0. (21)
The most general dynamical system on ΓΦ × ΓΨ, compatible with Eq. (19), is of the
form
ξ˙a = Pab(ξ)∂bH(ξ) +Ga(ξ, y) (22)
y˙i = F i(y) + J i(ξ, y), (23)
where we denoted the points of ΓΨ by yi; i is a discrete index that labels the mental degrees
of freedom. The vector F i on ΓΨ describes self-dynamics on ΓΨ. Interaction is described
by the vector fields Ga on ΓΦ and J i on ΓΨ.
Eq. (22) implies that
H˙ = Ga∂aH. (24)
Hence, energy is conserved if Ga∂aH = 0, i.e., if Ga is tangent to the surfaces of constant
energy. To motivate our subsequent analysis, let us first assume that physical degrees
of freedom satisfy some form of Hamilton equations, even in the presence of MBI. This
implies that Ga is a Hamiltonian vector field for each y, i.e., that
Ga(ξ, y) = Pab∂bS(ξ, y) (25)
for some scalar function S. Hence, energy is conserved if Pab∂aS∂bH = 0.
A Hamiltonian system with a large number of degrees of freedom may have constants
of the motion other than the Hamiltonian. However, it is highly implausible that we can
ever relate such constants, when they are defined for very different systems, for example,
a room with one person inside and a concert hall with one thousand persons.
We expect that energy-conserving dynamics of sufficient generality are possible only
if S depends on ξ solely through the Hamiltonian, i.,e., if S(ξ, y) = φ(H(ξ), y) for some
function φ : R × ΓΨ → R. Then, the evolution equation on ΓΦ becomes
ξ˙a = P˜ab(ξ, y)∂bH(ξ) (26)
where P˜ab(ξ, y) = [1 + φ′[H(ξ), y]]Pab(ξ), and the prime denotes the derivative of φ with
respect to its first argument. Hence, energy is conserved if the mental degrees of freedom
are coupled to the physical degrees of freedom through an antisymmetric tensor P˜ab.
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The tensor P˜ab is not an actual Poisson tensor, because it does not satisfy the Jacobi
identity, Eq. (20). However, a small modification of our previous analysis can justify a
Poisson tensor P˜ab in Eq. (26), leading to a ΨΦI theory with a much more interesting
mathematical structure.
To this end, let us assume that there is a submanifold Ω ⊂ ΓΨ that corresponds to the
mental vacuum of Sec. 5.2, i.e., if y ∈ Ω then no mental processes are present. Consider
now a Poisson tensor P˜ab that satisfies P˜ab = Pab, for any y ∈ Ω. Then, Eqs. (26) and
(23) define a dynamical system for MBI that reduces to the classical equations of motions
in absence of mental processes. Hence, they define a deterministic ΨΦI theory with energy
conservation.
The difference from our previous analysis is that Ga is not a Hamiltonian vector field,
i.e., Eq. (25) does not hold. Instead, Ga = ∆Pab∂bH, where ∆Pab = P˜ab − Pab.
The implementation of energy conservation constraints only one of the two equations
that describe the dynamical system, namely, Eq. (26) Thus, it persists even if the term
F i(y) of Eq. (23) is a ‘random force’, i.e., if the values of F i at each moment of time
are distributed probabilistically. Thus, energy conservation also applies to stochastic ΨΦI
theories—in fact it is completely insensitive to the dynamics of the mental degrees of
freedom—, as long as Eq. (26) is satisfied.
The same structure can be employed in order to define energy-conserving dynamics
for MBI theories, where matter is treated quantum mechanically. Schrödinger’s equation
on a Hilbert space H is equivalent to Hamilton’s equation on the projective Hilbert space
PH [42]. Hence, the above analysis can straightforwardly be transferred into a quantum
context.
B.2 Generalised energy
In mechanical systems, energy conservation arises as a consequence of the time-translation
symmetry, i.e., the fact that dynamics are unchanged under a transformation that moves
the time of the various events. It is plausible that the time translation symmetry of the
extended dynamics (22—23) corresponds to a conserved quantity K(ξ, y) that reduces to
the Hamiltonian H in a limit where the mind-body interaction term can be ignored. For
example, K(ξ, y) may be of the form L(y) +H(ξ), where L(y) is invariant under the self
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dynamics of the mental degrees of freedom, F i∂L = 0. Then,
K˙ = Ga∂aH + J
i∂iL, (27)
and the conservation of K leads to a relation between the coupling terms Ga and J i:
Ga∂aH + J
i∂iL = 0. If this condition holds, the Hamiltonian is part of a more general
conserved quantity K. Since K is assumed to follow from the time-translation symmetry of
the dynamics, its values should be identified with energy. Thus, L is a new form of energy
associated to mental processes, and the notion of energy has to be extended in order to
account for mind-body interactions.
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